

The Impact of Alternative Means of Minority Group Representation

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Abstract: In this paper we bridge two separate lines of inquiry regarding ethnic minorities. First, following on Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy, scholars have investigated the potential for institutions to reduce conflict in ethnically divided societies. Ethnic conflict is more likely to be minimized in societies that use institutions (ie. proportional representation) to enhance the representation of minority populations. Second, scholars have investigated how the descriptive representation of racial and ethnic minorities, through the use of majority-minority districts in the U.S., affects the behavior and attitudes of minorities. Ethnic minorities who are represented by "one of their own" have higher levels of participation and tend to be more positive. We bridge these two areas of inquiry and investigate, from a comparative perspective, how the representation of ethnic minorities influences political support and engagement across 22 ethnically diverse countries. We find that institutions such as single member plurality electoral systems tend to increase differences between ethnic minorities and non-minorities in terms of political participation. Limited access to political power also increases differences in behavior and attitudes while these differences tend to be minimized in countries that have special accommodations for ethnic minority representation.

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Introduction

Calls for group or descriptive representation are based on several different arguments. First, under-representation of minority groups may occur from discriminatory practices and enhancing or assuring group representation is one way of overcoming this systematic discrimination. If people belonging to a community express preferences as members of that community, electoral arrangements ought not to prevent these interests from being expressed (Kymlicka 1995). Second, representation of minority interests is assumed to influence policy outcomes. While Pitkin (1967) questions the effectiveness of descriptive representation, others such as Mansbridge (1999, 2000) suggest that descriptive representation can serve to facilitate communication between representative and the represented and to “crystallize” unexpressed minority interests that may not be on the political agenda. Third, not only may policy consequences be influenced by descriptive representation but the actual behavior and attitudes of minority populations may be positively influenced by being descriptively represented.

The question of fair minority group representation in democratic societies has taken on greater importance with the dramatic increase in the number of democracies worldwide. A major question concerning these developments is whether democracy is actually possible in plural or divided societies (Mill 1861; Rabushka and Sheplse 1972). From this follows questions about whether different institutional arrangements are better at facilitating democracy or cooperation between groups in divided societies. For example, Lijphart (1995) argues that institutions designed to share power (with features such as a federal structure, coalition governments and proportional representation) are better at ameliorating conflict in divided societies. Special arrangements may also

facilitate group representation for previously underrepresented groups. Research in the United States, for example, has focused on the consequences of electoral arrangements or redistricting on the representation of African-Americans and Latinos at the local level (Davidson and Grofman 1994; Bowler, Donovan and Brockington 2003). Comparative research has focused on how electoral arrangements influence the proportion of women in parliaments, not a minority group numerically but historically underrepresented (e.g. Norris 1985; Rule 1994). More recently, research has turned to the question of how representation influences the attitudes and behaviors of citizens belonging to minority groups (Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004; Tate 2001, Bobo and Gilliam 1990) and political participation of minority groups (Gay 2001; Tate 1991; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004). Much of the research on these latter questions has tended to focus on the representation of Latinos and African-Americans in the U.S. case, while questions on the influence of institutional design on ethnic conflict has taken a comparative approach.

In this paper we bridge these two main areas of research and examine, from a comparative perspective, how institutional arrangements and minority group representation influence political support and behavior among minority populations.¹

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Minority Representation

Lijphart (1986) has provided an influential account of how institutional arrangements can facilitate and maintain stability in ethnically divided societies.

According to Lijphart (1986, 1995), consociational democracies, which are characterized by institutions that demand compromise among political parties, minimizes conflict and allows diverse groups to exist within the same state. In particular, proportional electoral

systems (PR) foster the representation of smaller parties in parliament increasing the probability that ethnic minority parties will gain representation. The representation of ethnic minorities in parliament is assumed to increase support for the political system among members of these groups. Put another way, part of the consociational account suggests that descriptive representation is an important way of fostering support for the political system.

Lijphart's theory about consociational democracy has been used to argue that particular institutional arrangements should not only serve to increase system support among minorities but also reduce the amount of ethnic conflict. For example, using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database, Saideman et al. (2002) show that there are lower levels of ethnic conflict in societies that use proportional representation as a means of electing members of parliament. Other studies using MAR data also present evidence to suggest that PR reduces ethnic conflict (Cohen 1997; Ishiyama 2000). Nevertheless there is still a debate over whether proportional electoral systems can successfully reduce the intra-state ethnic conflict that has accompanied the growth of democracies (see Reilly 2001). Rather than fostering accommodation and cooperation, PR may actually serve to reinforce ethnic cleavages (Tsebelis 1990) and produce extreme fragmentation in the party system leading to instability (Taagepera 1998).

An important assumption about theories linking PR and decreased ethnic conflict is that PR leads to the representation of minority interests through the representation of members of minority groups in parliament. PR is assumed to increase the representation of ethnic minorities because it accommodates smaller parties. Where ethnic cleavages are politically salient, parties will tend to develop around these cleavages if PR is used

(Shugart 1994). Electoral systems with larger district magnitudes are better at accommodating smaller ethnic minority parties. As with any minority interest that is not geographically concentrated, when single member districts (SMD) exist (ie. the district magnitude=1), the ethnic minority group is better off working with one of the major parties in order to win concession rather than forming its own party (Taagepera 1994). With proportional representation ethnic minority parties have a greater chance of gaining representation on their own. In ethnically diverse countries, ethnic parties are more likely to emerge when proportional electoral formulas are used (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994); though, ethnic parties can emerge in countries where minority populations are regionally concentrated and vote in a bloc such as in India and Canada (Rae 1971).

Cases where there have been changes in electoral rules moving from single member districts to multi-member districts suggests that proportional representation and district magnitude is an important contributing factor to minority representation. In the United States, adoption of multi-member districts and cumulative voting (a “halfway point” between SMD and PR) increased the representation of Latino and African-Americans on town and city councils and school boards that had previously used single member districts and plurality rules (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington 2003). Even though there are reserved seats for the Maori population, the adoption of a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system in New Zealand further enhanced the representation of Maori in parliament to beyond proportionality (Banducci and Karp 1998).

Despite the evidence from the U.S. and New Zealand, one of the understudied aspects in the accounts of electoral systems and ethnic conflict is the degree to which

proportional electoral systems actually facilitate the election of representatives from minority groups.² There is clear evidence that PR enhances the representation of women in national legislatures and Lijphart (1999), Taagepera (1994) and Shugart (1994) use this evidence to generalize to ethnic minorities. However, it is not all clear that the same mechanisms that increase the representation of women will also enhance the representation of racial and ethnic minorities.³ Ideally, we would like to have a measure of the under-representation of ethnic minorities in national parliaments but, while data on women's representation is easily available through the Inter-parliamentary union, it has been difficult to gather data on the how many members of ethnic minority groups are elected to national parliaments.⁴

Proportional representation is not the only way of enhancing minority representation. Kymlicka (1995, 133-134) has argued that even in Anglo societies where there is a strong tradition of individual rights in representative government (accompanied by the use of single member districts) there are traditions of group representation such as the development of majority-minority districts and self-government for territories such as Puerto Rico in the U.S. Furthermore, districts have been drawn to facilitate the representation of interests based on factors such as agricultural interests or region. For example, the U.S. and Australian Senate are examples of cases where over-representation of regional interests is allowed because representation is based on states and not on population.

Some countries, where ethnic cleavages are salient, have adopted special accommodations to assure representation of minority interests in parliament. Lijphart (electoral laws and their consequences) outlines four methods of special ethnic

representation: rigid non-geographic ethnic districts, optional ethnic districts, predetermined ethnically mixed slates and special exemptions for ethnic minorities. In a comprehensive review of special accommodations used for ethnic minorities, Htun (2003) outlines statutory policies and political arrangements used to guarantee group representation. Examples of statutory policies include Venezuela and Colombia which each have reserved seats for indigenes and Lebanon which reserves seats for religious minorities. Examples of political arrangements that guarantee representation include the United States which uses the redistricting process to create single member districts where ethnic and racial minorities have a greater probability of being elected. Germany, Poland and Romania, which also use PR, have lower thresholds for ethnic minority parties (Htun 2003, 26).

However, while guaranteed representation provides for a proportion of seats in the legislative body to be held by members of a minority group, some suggest that it does not necessarily guarantee that minority representatives are accountable to the minority group. Kymlicka (149) suggests that while under-representation may result from discriminatory practices “it does not follow that reversing this exclusion through guaranteed seats ensures that the group’s interests or perspectives are then ‘represented’ (149). Also, it has been suggested that these special accommodations, rather than enhancing engagement and support, may actually serve to create resentment among the non-minority population and also lead to resentment among the various ethnic groups (Reynolds and Reilly 2002). Furthermore, reserved seats may only serve to further marginalize the ethnic minority groups (Htun 2003).

Representation and Political Support

Underlying the arguments about proportional representation and the reduction of ethnic conflict is the link between exclusion from the political process and the attitudes and behaviors of ethnic minority groups. For example, those who have used the MAR database to establish a link between PR and reduced ethnic conflict (e.g. Saideman et al. 2003) point to the possibility that electoral systems may alter the way citizens who are excluded from decision making view the political system. It has long been suggested that citizen attitudes about the political system can be linked to either a democracy characterized by stability or by protest, riots and terrorism. One potential cause of instability of democratic political systems is when citizens feel disconnected or alienated from the political process (Citrin et al. 1975). In some instances, the disconnection from politics may result in citizens opting out of the political process but in other instances it may lead to rebellious behavior (Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982).

Institutional arrangements and, in particular, electoral systems can alter the levels of political support. Furthermore, arrangements that tend to facilitate the incorporation of minority group interests through representation or power sharing tend to increase support among those groups that benefit from the institutional arrangements. Anderson and Guillory (1997) show that those who tend to be on the losing side of electoral contests are more satisfied under consensual systems rather than majoritarian systems. Banducci, Donovan and Karp (1999) show that the level of political efficacy for minor party supporters in New Zealand increased following a transition from a plurality system to proportional representation.

Further evidence shows that outside of electoral arrangements, descriptive representation enhances political support and engagement. While most of the research in this area is based on the U.S. it shows that having a representative of “one’s own” can increase participation (Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004 Gay 2001), reduce alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003), increase political efficacy (Banducci, Karp and Donovan 2005; Banducci, Karp and Donovan 2004) and trust in government (Howell and Fagan 1988).⁵ This line of research has relied on the political “empowerment model” (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The argument behind this “empowerment model” is that those minority groups that are excluded from positions of political power are aware of that they are politically disadvantaged (one of the most visible signs being the lack of elected representatives from the group). Awareness of being politically disadvantaged leads to distrust in and disengagement from the political process. This distrust and disengagement, as suggested above, can lead to rebellious behavior and instability.

In a direct examination of the relationship between the electoral system, minority status and political support, Norris (2004) questions the claim that PR can generate higher levels of support among ethnic minorities. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Norris shows that PR systems do not mediate the differences in political support between majority populations and ethnic minorities. In fact, the countries where there were significant differences between ethnic minority and non-minorities in political support (after controlling for socio-economic status) were PR countries such as New Zealand, Romania and Spain. On the other hand, Alonso and Ruiz (2005) find as the proportion of minorities represented increases, especially in

parliamentary systems, the level of protest among ethnic minorities decreases. This finding suggests that the degree of representation is an important intervening variable.

Expectations

So far we have outlined the links between electoral systems, descriptive representation, ethnic minorities and citizen's political support and engagement. From this outline, we can then build several expectations about how the representation will influence the attitudes and behavior of ethnic minorities. Based on Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy and subsequent research on PR and ethnic conflict, we expect that the differences in political support between majority and minority populations will be greatest in majoritarian systems where institutions are likely to produce disproportional results and smallest in PR systems. Aside from the electoral system, special accommodations for ethnic minorities in the national parliament may be another mechanism by which political support and engagement may be increased. On the other hand, rules that restrict minority access and influence should be expected to reduce political support among minorities.

Data and Methods

In order to examine the impact of alternative forms of enhancing representation for minority groups we rely on several different sources of data. Any analysis of minority group attitudes or behavior suffers from the same problem. By definition, minority groups make up a smaller proportion of the population. Using survey data based on national probability samples presents researchers with the problem of having a very small

number of minorities in the sample (if any). Furthermore, because many of these minority populations tend to be socially and economically disadvantaged, members of these groups will be less likely to respond to surveys and may be more difficult to reach. One solution to these problems is to either limit the survey population to minorities or to over-sample the minority population. Another approach, which we use in this paper, is to increase the number of minorities in the sample by pooling across a large number of countries. Admittedly, this approach addresses the first concern but not the second.

Our analysis is based on data from the World Values Survey [WVS] (2000-2002). We use these data because, to our knowledge, it represents the cross-national dataset with the largest number of countries where ethnic minority status can be identified and measures of political activity and attitudes are available.

Defining ethnic minority groups presents another challenge. As we use the term, ethnic minority groups can refer to social groups that are differentiated by country of origin, skin color, religion, language or caste. In order to identify ethnic minority groups, we rely on the classification used by Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. This data set currently contains information on 285 minority groups across 153 countries. A minority group at risk refers to an “ethnopolitical group (non-state communal group) that: (1) collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or (2) collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests (MAR Codebook, 5). Ethnic groups are identified if the group has a population larger than 100,000 or one percent of the country population, and it meets one of the criteria for inclusion as a minority at risk (Codebook, 8). We have further restricted our analysis to countries that are identified as electoral democracies by Freedom House.

Overall, there are 22 countries where ethnic minority status could be reliably measured. The WVS provide several different ways of identifying ethnic minority respondents. When available, we identified ethnic minorities by interviewer coded ethnicity. However, not all country surveys measured race and ethnicity.⁶ In these cases, we relied on language and religious identification. In a few cases self-identity (asking a respondent which group best describes him or her) was only available so we have used this when appropriate. Questions and identified groups are given in Appendix A.

To measure political involvement, we use two questions: (1) the respondent's level of political interest and (2) whether the respondent feels politics is important. If the respondent indicated that they are somewhat or very interested or that politics is important we have coded the respondent as "1". Otherwise, we give the respondent a score of "0". Political engagement includes a series of questions on conventional and unconventional political acts. Respondents were asked if they had participated in one of the following activities: signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending a lawful demonstration, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories. We have given a score of 1 to any respondent who mentioned participating in one of the political actions. Respondents who have not participated in any activities have been given a score of 0. Questions on participation in the last election are not available in the WVS so we have no indication of voter turnout.

As indicators of political support we rely on confidence in government institutions and satisfaction with national representatives.⁷ A scale on confidence in government institutions is created from three questions about confidence in the following institutions: parliament, government and political parties. The items have been rescaled to

range from 0 to 1. The scale is based on the average of the three items and has ten categories. Socio-economic characteristics are included as control variables. Satisfaction with national representatives also ranges from 0 to 1 and has four categories. Question wording for these are listed in Appendix B.

Aside from ethnic minority status, our main independent variables of interest are institutional rules, specifically the electoral system and the degree to which ethnic minorities are represented in decision making. In terms of the representation of minority groups, district magnitude is seen by some as the most important feature (Shugart 1994). In our analysis, we use a simple dichotomous variable indicating whether the electoral system is based on single member plurality/majority rules, where district magnitude is equal to 1.⁸ An important indicator of the level of minority representation in each country. As mentioned previously, direct indicators such as the proportion of minorities serving in the parliament are nearly impossible to obtain without significant resources for most countries in the sample. Therefore, we rely on a variable from the MAR database to indicate minority representation in positions of political power. The MAR project has coded the degree of differences in political power between majority and minorities at risk. These indicators measure actual political differentials that may result from historical differences but are not necessarily due to active discrimination. One dimension of these items measures whether there are differences in access to power. We have created a dichotomous variable where countries exhibiting substantial, major or extreme differential in access to power are coded as “1”. Of the 21 countries in the sample, 12 are considered to exhibit substantial or greater political differences. Despite our reservations about the proportion of women in the parliament as a proxy for the degree of ethnic

minority representation, we test whether it has the expected effect of ethnic minority representation on our dependent variables of interest. We have also coded countries that have special accommodations for the representation of minority groups in parliament. One country, Colombia, has special provisions for aboriginals but moderately restricts access by blacks to higher office. The coding of the institutional variables discussed above is listed in Table 1 of the Appendix.

Because cross-national variations in political engagement and support are due to factors other than the political representation of minority groups, we control for a number of contextual factors that may influence our main independent variables. We control for the level of economic development and the stage of democratic development. GNI per capita is used to indicate the degree of economic development while we have created a dichotomous variable which gives established a score of 1 and others a score of 0.

Our analysis proceeds by first examining bivariate differences in the attitudes and behavior of ethnic minorities and non-minorities across different institutional contexts. We then test for the conditioning effects of these different institutional conflicts on the degree of differentiation between ethnic minorities and non-minorities in multivariate models.

Results

Table 1 shows differences between ethnic minorities and non-minorities on the indicators of political engagement by different institutional contexts (see Table 2 in the Appendix for differences by country). As discussed above, political involvement ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 represents the lowest level of political involvement. Ethnic

minorities in countries where access to power is limited are less involved than non-minorities. When averaged across the different contexts, we see that there is a significant difference between minority and non-minority respondents in countries where there is limited access to power for the minority group but no significant differences in countries where access to power is more equal. When averaged across the type of electoral system, there are significant differences in both plurality/majority systems as well as in the proportional systems. While we expected the differences to be largest in SMD systems, the gap in political involvement between minorities and non minorities is somewhat larger in PR systems. Ethnic minorities are less involved than non-minorities where there are no special arrangements but the differences are not statistically significant.

The results for political participation are more consistent with expectations. Ethnic minorities are significantly less likely to participate than non-minorities in countries where they have limited access to power, where there are no special accommodations for ethnic minority representation and in plurality electoral systems. With respect to political participation, ethnic minorities are less likely than non minorities to participate in SMD systems and the difference between them are more substantial. Specifically, there is a gap between minorities and non-minorities in participation of .14 in SMD systems compared to just .02 in PR systems. These initial results in Table 1 show that the context can shape the political engagement of ethnic minorities. Consistent with expectations, we see that in countries where there is a greater probability of power sharing (no limited access to power, special accommodations for representation and PR rules) the differences between ethnic minorities and non-minorities on indicators of political access tend to be minimized or insignificant.

(Table 1 here)

Table 2 shows mean differences in political support among minority and non-minority populations.⁹ Of the measures of political support that we use, satisfaction with national representatives may come closest to tapping attitudes that are influenced by the make-up of the parliament and significant differences on satisfaction with national representatives are evident in some cases. When there is limited access to power for minorities, minorities are significantly less likely to be satisfied with national representatives. The difference is reversed when there are no differences in access to power but it is not significant. Under PR rules, contrary to expectations, the difference in satisfaction between ethnic minorities and non-minorities is larger (and significant) than the difference under majoritarian rules. With respect to confidence in government institutions, we find no significant differences in confidence in government institutions between minorities and non-minorities. In fact, ethnic minorities do not consistently have lower levels of confidence.

(Table 2 here)

We next turn to a multivariate analysis where we examine how institutional features and levels of minority representation influence the differences between minority and non-minority populations. To examine how institutional features condition the differences between minorities and non-minorities we include interaction terms between minority status and the institutional features considered above. We also control for individual level socio-economic characteristics that may influence levels of political engagement and support. In order to simplify the presentation, we have not included the estimated coefficients for the individual level variables (except for ethnic minority status

in the full model) because our interest is in how the institutional variables influence attitudes and behavior. In our analysis, we weight the data to equal sample sizes in each country.

Table 3 shows the estimates for the model predicting our indicators for political engagement. Turning to the model predicting political involvement, we do see that limited access to power and special accommodation influence the effect of ethnic minority status on whether individuals are interested in or feel politics is important. The sign on the interaction term for special accommodation and ethnic minority status indicates that ethnic minorities in countries with special accommodations are significantly more likely to be involved in politics than ethnic minorities in countries without special accommodations. Furthermore, ethnic minorities are less likely to be involved in countries where there is limited access to power. Consistent with the results in Table 1, we also see that ethnic minorities under majoritarian rules are less politically active.

(Table 3 here)

In Table 4 we show the results for the indicators of political support: satisfaction with national representatives and confidence in government institutions. When countries have special accommodations, ethnic minorities are both more satisfied with national representatives and have more confidence in government institutions. On the other hand, in countries where ethnic minorities are excluded, ethnic minorities are significantly less likely to be satisfied with national representatives.

We also tested interactions between ethnic minority status and the proportion of women represented. However, none of these interactions were significant in the expected

direction. We do see that women's representation is related to both higher levels of political engagement and political support across both ethnic minorities and non-minorities.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper we have attempted to bridge the aggregate cross-national literature which finds a relationship between institutional arrangements, specifically the electoral system, and the degree of ethnic conflict and the "political empowerment" literature which suggests that choosing a representative of one's own can alter attitudes and behavior. We have tried to replicate earlier tests of based on the US and New Zealand in terms of the effect of descriptive representation on political support and political engagement.

Generally our results support expectations that ethnic minority/non-minority differences in political engagement and political support will be minimized under certain institutional arrangements. These institutional arrangements are either directly or indirectly related to the representation of ethnic minorities in national parliaments. Particularly important in reducing differences is an indicators of access to power. Our initial bivariate analysis presented in Tables 1 and 2 do show that differences between ethnic minorities and non-minorities are significant and the magnitude of the difference greater in countries where there is limited access to political power. These results generally hold up in the multivariate analysis. Significant differences are evident on the indicators of political involvement and satisfaction with representatives. Also important are special allowances for ethnic minority representation. Differences on both indicators

of political support and the measure of political involvement are minimized when there are special allowances.

The findings are not so clear on the role of the electoral systems. In the bivariate results, except in the case of political participation, differences were greater not less in PR systems. In the multivariate analysis, there are significant ethnic minority/non-minority differences under SMD rules indicating that ethnic minorities are more politically active in PR systems. However, on the indicators of political support, differences do not appear to be exaggerated under SMD rules. This is contrary to our expectations but not inconsistent with the findings of Norris (2004) who examined whether PR reduced differences in political support between minority and non-minority populations. Based on a country by country analysis, she concludes that ethnic differences were actually reduced in majoritarian systems not PR systems.

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Appendix A: Ethnic Minority Status

World Values Survey Questions:

1. Ethnic Group (coded by observation)
2. Identity: Which of the following best describes you?
3. Language: What language do you normally speak at home?
4. Country of Origin: Were you born in this country? In which country were you born?
5. Religion: Do you belong to a religious denomination? Which one?

Countries and Ethnic Groups Identified:

Albania: Greek; Roma
Australia: Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
Brazil: Black; Indigenous
Canada: Quebecois; French Canadians; Native/Indigenous
Chile: Indigenous
Taiwan: Hakka; Aboriginal [identified by language]
Colombia: Black; Indigenous
Dominican Republic: Black
Georgia: Russian; Ossetian, Adzhars; Abkhazian [identified by language]
India: Scheduled Tribes; Sikhs; Muslims
Indonesia: Javanese; Sudanese; Sumatranese [based on self identification]
Israel: Arab
Mexico: Black; Indigenous
Moldova: Slavs; Gagaus
New Zealand: Maori
Nigeria: Hausa; Yoruba; Edo [identification based on language]
Peru: Black; Other (indigenous)
Philippines: Igorots and Moros MAR database; identified by Muslim religion
South Africa: Coloured; Indian
Spain: Catalan; Basque [identified by language]
United States: Black; Latino; Native American
Venezuela: Black; Indigenous

Appendix B: Question Wording

For each item, coding using in analysis is given in parentheses.

Political Support

A. Confidence in Government

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (.66), not very much confidence (.33) or none at all (0)?

- a. The government in YOUR CAPITAL
- b. Political Parties
- c. Parliament

B. Satisfaction with National Representatives

How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied (1), fairly satisfied (.66), fairly dissatisfied (.33) or very dissatisfied (0)?

Political Engagement

A. Political Interest:

How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested(1); Somewhat interested (.66); Not very interested (.33); Not at all interested (0).

B. Political Activities

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things (1), whether you might do it (0) or would never, under any circumstances, do it (0).

- a. Signing a petition
- b. Joining in boycotts
- c. Attending lawful demonstrations
- d. Joining unofficial strikes
- e. Occupying buildings or factories.

Endnotes

¹ In this paper we use the terms “ethnic” and “ethnic minority” to refer to groups that are differentiated along racial, ethnic, religious, language, country of origin and status as “original peoples.” Our use of the term “ethnic” and “ethnic minority” to indicate these groups is a more inclusive use of the term “ethnic” than is usually used. However, ethnic identities can largely be seen as social constructs based on the divisions listed above and the more inclusive use of the term is increasing (see Htun 2003).

² Based on case studies of France, Denmark and Canada, Bird(2004) identifies other factors in addition to the electoral system that influence the representation of ethnic minorities. These other factors include the size and spatial concentration of the ethnic group, openness of citizenship rules, degree of cultural assimilation, party competition and legislative turnover.

³ For example, in the United States, at large elections increase the proportion of women elected in municipalities while ward elections are better at electing African-Americans (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). In these cases, the effectiveness of different electoral systems at increasing minority representation is dependent on the geographic distribution of the minority population. From a global perspective, Htun (2003) suggests that ethnic groups are more likely to be aligned with political communities which is not the case with women: political parties in democracies are more likely to respond to demands for women’s representation with the use of party quotas but states are more likely to use reserved seats for ethnic minorities. Mechanisms such as party quotas are have shown to be more influential at increasing women’s representation than proportional representation (Caul 2001) and there are not noted cases of party quotas for ethnic minorities (Htun

2003). Furthermore, the representation of women is more dependent on the responsiveness of parties to pressure to nominate women (both to appeal to voters and satisfy intra-party demands) while the representation of ethnic minorities depends on the formation of ethnic parties (see Taagepera 1994).

⁴ Using data we obtained for ethnic minority representation in 20 countries, the correlation between minority and women's representation was non-existent, but when an outlier (Ukraine) is dropped the correlation increases to .30. The low correlation suggests that these indicators are not analogous. Despite the small sample, we feel we have diverse sample of countries in terms of cultural and institutional variables (Hungary, Latvia, Russia, Czech Republic, Australia, United Kingdom, Albania, Lithuania, Moldova, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Slovakia, USA, New Zealand, Canada and Ukraine). We found that countries such as the United States and New Zealand routinely reported the number minority representatives elected to national legislatures. Data on representation in 10 East European countries was reported in Alonso and Ruiz and (2004). Data on Brazil are from Johnson (1998). Data on other countries was obtained from country experts or from Internet searches. Where possible, we identified minority representatives by examining photographs on parliamentary webpages. However, this proved impossible in a lot of countries where ethnic minorities are not readily identifiable by skin color or names.

⁵ In one exception to the U.S. focus, Fennema and Tillie (1999) find that increased representation of ethnic minorities on municipal councils and voter turnout are linked. However, they also find that ethnic minorities (with the exception of Turks) have lower rates of participation and trust than the majority population.

⁶ Race and ethnicity were not available in most Western European countries. It is not clear whether questions measuring ethnic background were not included in the survey instrument or whether they were excluded from the archived data set.

⁷ Satisfaction with democracy was not asked in every country so it was not included in the analysis.

⁸ When we substituted district magnitude for our dichotomous measure we found no substantive changes in the results indicating that the difference between single member and multi-member districts is the most important distinction in our analysis.

⁹ The survey in Israel did not report values for these questions on political support.

Table 1: Mean Differences in Political Engagement by Minority Status and Institutional Rules

	Political Involvement				Political Participation			
	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference		Non-Minority	Minority	Difference	
No limited access to power	.41	.42	.02		.55	.57	.03	
Limited access to power	.36	.29	-.07	**	.63	.54	-.09	**
No special arrangements	.57	.52	-.05		.39	.35	-.03	**
Special arrangements	.65	.63	-.02		.36	.38	.01	
Proportional rules	.59	.52	-.07	**	.31	.29	-.02	**
Majoritarian rules	.63	.61	-.03	**	.61	.47	-.14	**

**p<.01

Table 2: Mean Differences in Attitudes about Government by Minority Status and Institutional Rules

	Satisfaction with Reps				Confidence in Government			
	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference		Non-Minority	Minority	Difference	
No limited access to power	.45	.49	.04		.40	.42	.02	
Limited access to power	.42	.40	-.02	**	.40	.41	.01	
No special arrangements	.44	.46	.02		.41	.42	.01	
Special arrangements	.42	.44	.02		.38	.42	.04	
Proportional rules	.40	.38	-.03	**	.39	.39	.00	
Majoritarian rules	.51	.55	.04		.42	.45	.03	

**p<.01

Table 3: Political Engagement: Logit Coefficients

	Political Involvement			Political Participation		
	Coef.	St. Error	Min-Max	Coef.	St. Error	Min-Max
GNI per capita	0.11 ***	(0.03)	0.09	0.22 ***	(0.03)	0.18
Women's representation	0.00 *	(0.00)	0.03	0.03 ***	(0.00)	0.23
Established democracy	-0.14 **	(0.06)	0.03	1.21 ***	(0.06)	0.29
Special accomodation	0.00	(0.04)	0.00	-0.03	(0.04)	0.01
Limited access to power	0.22 ***	(0.04)	0.05	-0.52 ***	(0.04)	0.12
Majoritarian rules	0.16 ***	(0.06)	0.04	0.15 **	(0.06)	0.03
Minority at risk	-0.10	(0.08)	0.02	0.11	(0.09)	0.02
Minority*Special accomodation	0.42 ***	(0.11)	0.10	-0.03	(0.12)	0.01
Minority*Limited power	-0.20 *	(0.11)	0.05	-0.10	(0.12)	0.07
Minority*Majoritarian rules	0.08	(0.10)	0.02	-0.32 ***	(0.11)	
Pseudo R^2 (Cragg & Uhler's)	0.04			0.24		
n (weighted)	18,901			18,901		

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Note: Estimates for socio-economic controls (female, age, education, employment status, social class and income) not shown. Each interaction has been tested separately. Only significant interactions are reported. All other main effects, significant or not, are reported.

Data from Israel are missing

Source: World Values Surveys

Table 4: Political Attitudes: Ordered Logit Coefficients

	Satisfaction with Reps			Confidence in Government		
	Coef.	St. Error	Min-Max	Coef.	St. Error	Min-Max
GNI per capita	0.17 ***	(0.03)	0.07	-0.05 *	(0.03)	0.01
Women's representation	0.03 ***	(0.00)	0.09	0.01 ***	(0.00)	0.02
Established democracy	-1.00 ***	(0.06)	0.12	-0.85 ***	(0.06)	0.04
Special accomodation	0.34 ***	(0.04)	0.04	0.08	(0.04)	0.00
Limited access to power	-0.11 ***	(0.04)	0.01	0.18 ***	(0.04)	0.01
Majoritarian rules	1.25 ***	(0.08)	0.15	0.89 ***	(0.07)	0.04
Minority at risk	-0.19 ***	(0.07)	0.02	-0.23 ***	(0.07)	0.01
Minority*Special accomodation	0.26 **	(0.11)	0.03	0.40 ***	(0.11)	0.02
Minority*Limited power	-0.23 **	(0.11)	0.03	0.06	(0.11)	0.00
Minority*Majoritarian rules	0.14	(0.10)	0.02	0.16	(0.10)	0.01
Pseudo R^2 (Cragg & Uhler's)	0.08			0.03		
n (weighted)	17,161			16,625		

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Note: Estimates for socio-economic controls (female, age, education, employment status, social class and income) not shown. Each interaction has been tested separately. Only significant interactions are reported. All other main effects, significant or not, are reported.

Data from Israel are missing

Min-max represents the average change in probability across each category of the dependent variable.

Source: World Values Surveys

Appendix Table 1: Institutional Factors Associated with Minority Representation

Country	Limited Power*	Special Accomodations†	Majoritarian System
Albania			
Australia	x		x
Brazil			
Canada			x
Chile	x		
Colombia	x	x	
Dominican Republic	x		
Georgia			
India	x	x	x
Indonesia	x		
Israel	x		
Mexico	x		
Moldova			
New Zealand	x	x	
Nigeria			x
Peru			
Philippines	x		
South Africa	x		
Spain			
Taiwan	x	x	
United States		x	x
Venezuela		x	

*Minorities at Risk (MAR); †Htun (2003)

Appendix Table: Mean Differences by Minority Status and Country

	Political Involvement			Participation			Satisfaction with Reps			Confidence in Government		
	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference	Non-Minority	Minority	Difference
Albania	.47	.18	-.30				.16	.26	.10	.27	.44	.17
Brazil	.59	.49	-.10				.43	.50	.07			
Canada	.60	.44	-.16				.50	.54	.04	.38	.42	.04
Columbia	.71	.59	-.12									
Georgia	.62	.53	-.08	.27	.21	-.06	.26	.31	.05			
Indonesia				.15	.10	-.05						
Israel				.49	.25	-.25						
Mexico				.20	.07	-.13						
New Zealand				.89	.82	-.07	.23	.32	.09			
Nigeria							.58	.60	.02			
Peru										.27	.31	.04
South Africa	.57	.38	-.19	.37	.30	-.06	.40	.46	.06	.41	.49	.08
Spain				.35	.26	-.09	.36	.47	.11	.37	.44	.07
Taiwan	.58	.49	-.09	.30	.23	-.07						
United States				.87	.71	-.16						

Note: All differences significant at $p < .01$ except where noted.

+ $p = .06$